

cryptocurrencies and distributed ledger technologies

a (largely incomplete) timeline

- 1999: first popular p2p service (Napster)
- 2008: Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
- 2010: first real transaction
 - 2 pizzas for 10K BTC
- 2011: “Altcoins” begin to appear
 - Namecoin, Litecoin, etc.
- 2014: UK treasury commissioned a study on cryptocurrencies
- 2017:
 - BTC quotation about 16K\$
 - Russia and Estonia announce plans for government backed cryptocurrency
 - blockchain (DLT) and cryptocurrencies regarded as **game-changers**

Bitcoin, blockchain and DLT

- Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency...
- ...based on a technology called **blockchain**
- a number of variation of the blockchain are possible and many are used
- they collectively are called **Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT)**

a DLT solves one fundamental problem

- many subjects need to agree on **transactions...**
- **...without trusting each other**
- transactions are recorded on a **ledger**
- the ledger is **replicated**
 - each participant has a copy of it
- **consensus** on what is a “good copy” of the ledger is reached in a **distributed** manner
 - no central authority to be trusted

DLT for a cryptocurrency

- transactions are payments
- the ledger records payments
- a “good copy” conforms to plain accounting rules, e.g....
 - **no double spending** of money
 - controlled **money creation**
 - **no charge back**
 - conditions to unlock funds...and many other technical rules
 - e.g. format of the records

ledgers and security

- a ledger is used by a community of *subjects* (or *parties* to transactions)
- it is updated for each transaction
- requirements
 - parties to a transaction need **guarantees about recording and consensus**
 - old transactions must be **immutable**
 - all involved nodes **see and agree on a single ledger status** at a certain instant
 - ...that conforms to all consensus rules
- DLTs fulfill these requirements without centralized trusted authority

potential applications of DLT

- real estate registry
- companies registry
- parcels delivery tracking
- civil registry
- financial transactions
- insurance
- medical records
- trial records
- ...

many have legal implications

(un)permissioned DLT

- **unpermissioned DLT**
 - anybody (as subject or node) can join
 - large networks
 - slow
 - e.g., Bitcoin
- **permissioned DLT**
 - only authorized subjects/nodes can join
 - small networks
 - fast
 - typically belonging to industry/banking consortiums

cryptocurrencies elements

- **identifiers** of transaction parties (addresses)
- **ledger** content, format, consistency
 - many technical rules
- **p2p protocol** to broadcast accepted and pending transactions
- **distributed consensus algorithm**
 - a way to reach consensus “securely”
- **incentives**
- **money creation and accounting constraints**

Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)

- **identifiers**
- **ledger**
- **p2p protocol**
- **distr. consensus alg.**

DLT
permissioned

DLT unpermissioned

- **incentives**

- **money creation and accounting constraints**

cryptocurrency

identifiers

- identification of subjects is done by private/public key pairs
- in unpermissioned DLT, subjects autonomously create private/public key pairs, possibly many of them
 - having many IDs improves confidentiality
- in permissioned DLT, subjects might be all well known to all nodes
 - shared subject directory and strictly regulated access

ledger

- essentially a log of transactions
- addition of transaction occur on a **block** basis
 - a block contains many transaction
- most of the machinery of a DLT is about the addition of a block to the ledger


p2p protocol

- nodes discovery (the first to connect to)
- node interconnection
- broadcasting
 - new blocks added to the ledger
 - pending transactions
- each new/pending transaction is broadcasted
- when a node pretend to add a block to the ledger, the new block is broadcasted

distributed consensus algorithm

- it is a way to accept a new block
- mandate that “all” accept the same block(s)
 - eventually they will have the same view of the ledger
- check for format rules and other semantic rules
 - easy
- contrast “byzantine” (malicious) behavior of nodes...
 - ... which might pretend to subvert the rules
 - hard
- many solutions, a few very famous
 - Proof-of-Work (for unpermissioned DLT)
 - slow but scale to high number of nodes
 - Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant (for permissioned DLT)
 - fast but feasible only for a small number of nodes

distributed consensus algorithms overview



source: M. Vukolić. The Quest for Scalable Blockchain Fabric: Proof-of-Work vs. BFT Replication. iNetSec 2015 (adapted)

incentive

- needed only for unpermissioned DLT
- anybody can join the DLT
 - usually is better to have a large number of nodes
- people have to get an advantage to join
 - joining means sharing resources with a community
- the advantage is usually some form of “money” (*tokens*)
 - that is, even not strictly money-related DLT have their own form of currency that can be exchanged for real money

“money semantic”

- creation
 - mining, premining, minting, etc.
 - tightly related with the incentive problem
- accounting rules
 - no double spending
 - no charge back
 - transaction fees
- unlocking of funds
 - proving ownership (by cryptographic means)
 - possibly complex rules (smart contracts)

bitcoin


relevant concepts

- addresses
- transactions
 - txin, txout, utxo, fees
- blocks
- blockchain
- proof-of-work

addresses


- created off-line by your wallet software
 - as many as you want
- private/public key pair
- **an address is a cryptographic hash of the public key**
- ECDSA standard is used
- notable properties:
 - private keys are random numbers
 - the public key are derived from the private one
 - password based wallet with no explicit key storage are possible
 - Hierarchical Deterministic wallets

address derivation details




- this is the most common kind of address
- it is called “pay to public key hash” (p2pkh)

transactions (TXs)



- transactions form a directed acyclic graph
- txout is associated with...
 - **an amount**
 - expressed in satoshi
 - 1 satoshi = 10^{-8} BTC, i.e., about 0.0001\$
 - **a destination address**
 - actually a script typically checking for the address
 - dest. addresses may or may not belong to the same subject

utxo



- a txout can be...
 - **spent**, i.e. attached to a txin of another transaction
 - **unspent**, called **unspent tx output (utxo)**, i.e., no txin attached
- currently “existing” bitcoins are those “stored” at utxo
 - ... and at addresses associated with current utxo
- **a txin always spends the whole utxo amount**
- partial spending is realized by adding a txout with a “change address”
 - i.e. returning money to addresses that belong to the same subject owning addresses involved in txin

transaction (un)balance and fees

- sum of amounts for txin's should be greater than the sum of amount of txout's
- the difference is the transaction fee
 - it is implicitly specified by the unbalance

$$Fee = \sum TxIn - \sum TxOut \geq 0$$

- the fee goes to the node that succeeds in putting the transaction in the blockchain
- nodes pick transactions with the highest fees!
 - block size is limited to 1MB! (see after)
 - your transaction might never be accepted due to low fee

txid

- a txid is a cryptographic hash of a transaction
- it is “almost” an id
- “almost”?
 - a design mistake
 - security problems was fixed
 - you can safely consider it as an ideal id

transactions: getting money out of a utxo

- txout are ordered
- each txin specifies a txout by...
 - txid (the transaction)
 - the index (i.e., the order) of the txout in that transaction
- each txin provides a **cryptographic proof** that the tx creator has the private key for the destination address of the txout

getting money out of a utxo: cryptographic proof

- this is similar to a challenge response protocol
- txin of a transaction tx provides...
 - public key whose hash should match the address in txout
 - **signature** of a string X
- X is a string derived from...
 - tx where signatures are omitted
 - signing the signature is clearly impossible!
 - the destination address contained in referred txout
 - actually a string derived from the script containing the destination address!
 - it is a quite tricky procedure
 - see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/OP_CHECKSIG

lifecycle of a transaction


- a node n creates a tx locally
 - it computes all signatures proving private key possession
 - the node should know all previous transactions
- n send it in broadcast
- nodes that receives tx check for its validity
- all nodes puts tx into a “pool” of pending transactions
- all nodes try to put tx in the **blockchain**

blockchain

- this is the ledger of bitcoin
- it is made of **blocks**
- a block contains many of transactions
- blocks are chained in a sort of authenticated singly linked list
 - hence, blocks are strictly ordered and numbered (depth of a block)
- adding a block is...
 - difficult (proof-of-work approach)
 - provides the node with a reward (incentive) of newly created bitcoins and transaction fees

reward (Bitcoin creation)



- each block create a new amount of bitcoin
 - called “coinbase”
- started at 50BTC/block
- halved every 210000 blocks (about 4 years)
 - total number of BTC is limited
- as of Dec 2017 it is 12.5BTC/block (about 200K\$)
- it is represented as a special transaction
 - the first of each block, no txin, only one txout



block content

- payload, i.e., the transactions
 - block size is limited to 1MB
 - nodes pick transactions with the highest fees! your transaction might never be accepted due to low fee
- header
 - timestamp (very roughly approximated)
 - hash of all transactions
 - **a root hash of a Merkle hash tree** of all transactions in the payload
 - the hash of the header of the previous block of the blockchain
 - a nonce
 - this is the solution of the puzzle for the proof-of-work approach
 - other stuff

block content



courtesy of G. Di Battista and R. Tamassia

consensus

- adding a block requires to solve a cryptographic puzzle (proof-of-work, PoW)
 - by enumeration approach
- **consensus is implicit**
 - a node that works for the next block is accepting all previous ones
- **forks** may happen:
 - two nodes solve the next block at roughly “same time”
 - with two distinct solutions
 - the two block are broadcasted (fork)
 - actually some nodes see only one of them (non instantaneous broadcast), others see both and choose one
 - the two chains might grow independently for a while

fork resolution

the longest chain rule

- a node that sees more chains **chooses the longest one**
 - transactions that are in a discarded block are put in the pending transaction pool again
- the longest chain has more work done on it
 - in terms of computation performed
- the chain that grow faster is random

consensus attacks

general objectives

- changes to old blocks already accepted by at least some nodes
 - it is about integrity of the blockchain: important for all DLTs
 - might allow chargeback, double spending, and illegitimate change other parameters of the network
- DoS: denial of acceptance of certain transactions

transaction confirmation

- **confirmed: stored in an immutable block, forever**
- PoW does not provide “mathematical guarantee” of confirmation
- a transaction is considered confirmed if it is enough deep in the blockchain!
- “enough” depends on the criticality of the transaction
- usual confirmation depths are 1 to 6

consensus attacks and confirmation depth

- changing of a deep block $b...$
- ...requires the attacker to solve again all blocks above b
- the attacker needs a huge amount of computing power to reach and surpass the legitimate chain
- the more b is deep the more is “confirmed”

consensus attacks: Sybil

from “Sybil: The True Story of a Woman Possessed by 16 Separate Personalities” –F. R. Schreiber - 1973

- who controls a large number of nodes can isolate a “victim” node
- the victim see a different blockchain where she can get “malicious payments”
- the malicious payment disappear when the attack terminates and legitimate chain is broadcasted
 - **chargeback, double spending**
- can be detected by observing an anomalously low “hash power”

consensus attack: 51%

- who controls more than 50% of the computational power can...
 - disconfirm recently confirmed blocks
 - by surpassing with its chain all other forks
 - get 100% of the rewards
 - by keeping adding blocks

proof-of-work: the puzzle

- find a block whose header hash is below a certain **target threshold**
 - $\text{SHA256}(\text{SHA256}(\text{Block_Header})) < \text{threshold}$
 - lower is harder
 - $\text{difficulty} = \text{maxthreshold} / \text{threshold}$
- target threshold is “given”
- a node can search for a solution varying...
 - nonce
 - timestamp (within certain limits)
 - the set of transactions

target threshold adjustment

- the target threshold at a certain instant is fixed for all nodes
 - current target is stored in the last block
- it is adjusted so that time for solving the puzzle is 10 minutes on average
 - the average tx acceptance delay tend to be 5 minutes
- it is a feedback control loop
 - inputs: the time needed for last 2016 blocks and current threshold
 - output: new threshold
- adjustment happen every 2016 blocks
 - two weeks on average
 - only the node that solve the $k \cdot 2016^{\text{th}}$ block can change it (it is a consensus rule)

maximum theoretical transaction acceptance throughput

- maximum size of the block is 1MB
- minimum useful tx size is 226 bytes
 - tx with p2pkh addresses, two outputs (one for change), one input
- $1 \text{ [MB/block]} / 226 \text{ [B/tx]} / 600 \text{ [s/block]} =$

7.32 [tx/s]

- current average about 3.5 [tx/s]

bitcoin policy: the block length dilemma

- larger block size
 - lower fees
 - more txs in a block
 - harder to be a miner
 - more bandwidth, more ram, etc.
 - less democracy
 - limited number of miners can easily decide on the future of Bitcoin: easier to agree to change rules, easier to collude to reach 51% computing power
- smaller block size
 - higher fees
 - easier to be a miner
 - more democratic governance

segregated witness (SegWit)

- a soft fork activated on August 24, 2017
- strip signatures from transactions
 - put it in a “side chain”
 - replace the concept of block length with “block weight”
- new address format (SegWit address)
 - transaction should get money from new segwit addresses to “weight less”
 - slow adoption
- equivalent to have about 2MB of block size

Simplified Payment Verification (thin clients)

- thin clients do not store the whole blockchain
- they store just block headers
 - 80 bytes, about 4MB/year
- when transaction information is needed an untrusted full node is contacted
 - Merkle tree! proof used for integrity check against the root hash stored in the trusted header

