

XSS and CSRF

Outline

- Client-Side Security
 - Resources
 - SOP – Same Origin Policy
- XSS – Cross-Site Scripting
- CSRF – Cross-Site Request Forgery

Cross-Site Scripting

Cross-Site Scripting

- An XSS is an injection of JavaScript code inside a page
- If an attacker manages to execute JavaScript code inside a page of a victim, he/she can:
 - Steal session cookies, and then log-in as the victim
 - Steal information inside pages
 - Do actions on behalf of the victim

Cross-Site Scripting

- XSSs are a type of code injections
- They happen in two ways:
 - When the backend reflects unsafe user input on the output page, without any type of sanitization
 - When a generated page unsafely use external input (DOM XSS)

Reflected XSS

- Reflected XSSs are the most common XSS types
- They are called reflected because they happen when the content of some HTTP variable is "reflected" (= echoed) on the response page
- If this reflection happens without any sanitization, then it is possible to inject a `<script>` tag, and consequentially some JavaScript code

Reflected XSS

- For example, take the following PHP code of the site "foo.bar":

```
<?php  
echo 'hello ' . $_GET['name'];
```

Reflected XSS

- If the script is in the page "hello.php", then at the link <http://foo.bar/hello.php?name=baz> a user would get the response:
- The parameter *name* is reflected in the page, without any kind of sanitization

hello baz

Reflected XSS

- An attacker could then inject a <script> tag, with some php
- For example, once a user clicks on the link

`http://foo.bar/hello.php?name=<script>alert(1)</script>`

- The page would execute the JavaScript code "alert(1)", and the user would only see a pop-up with a 1

Stored XSS

- Stored XSSs work in a similar way of the reflected XSSs
- They are an injection flaw too, but they don't require user interaction at all
- A stored XSS takes place when some data that is "stored" by the site is reflected somewhere without any sanitization
- Stored means that it is saved in some way by the application, for example inside a database

Stored XSS

- A typical example is the comment section of a blog:
 - If the content of a comment is not sanitized before being outputted in the page, a rogue user can inject JavaScript code
- Since the comment is saved in the database, every user that visits the page with that comment is "attacked" by the malicious JavaScript code

Stored XSS

- This kind of injection doesn't require any user interaction at all, because the attacker doesn't need to send a link to the victim
- The user just needs to wait until the victim visit the compromised page by itself

Preventing XSS

- Reflected and Stored XSS are difficult to prevent:
 - Even in a small web application, there are a lot of ways some user input can be output
 - Different contexts require different sanitization methods
- As always, the general rule is to sanitize any unsafe data

Preventing XSS

- Generally, the sanitization is done by replacing every dangerous HTML character with its HTML encoded version
- Dangerous characters are different by the point in which they are echoed on the page, normally they are:
 - `< > "`
- Once "HTML-encoded", they become:
 - `< > "`

Preventing XSS

- Every language has its functions that do this kind of sanitization
- PHP for example uses htmlspecialchars
 - <https://www.php.net/manual/en/function htmlspecialchars.php>
- Using this kind of function can be dangerous:
 - It is very likely to forget to call them when echoing some user-supplied data

Preventing XSS

- A less error-prone way to prevent XSS is to use templates
- Templates are documents that look-like the final page, with placeholders in which unsafe data can be echoed in the page in a safe manner
- Since every output in which some user-input can be echoed is a placeholder, the web application can sanitize everything by default

Preventing XSS

- For example, a template of the "hello" page would look like the following

```
<html>  
<head>...</head><body>  
Hello {{user_name}}  
</body>  
</html>
```

- The "template engines", that is the program that renders the template, would then substitute the `user_name` var with the sanitized user input, thus preventing the XSS

Excercise

<http://xss1.challs.cyberchallenge.it/>

Goal: get the admin cookie!

The cookie can be read with “document.cookie”

Cross-Site Request Forgery

CSRF

- Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a type of attack that occurs when a malicious Web site, email, blog, instant message, or program causes a user's Web browser to perform an unwanted action on a trusted site for which the user is currently authenticated

CSRF

- Imagine a bank that lets users send money to other users
- One they start the transaction, a link the following is generated:

`http://bank.site/transact?to=user2&money=1000`

- An attacker could replace the "user2" with its account name, then send the link to the victim
- If the victim clicks on the link, then the transaction

CSRF

- An attacker could replace user2 with its account name, then send the link to the victim

`http://bank.site/transact?to=attacker&money=1000`

- If the victim clicks on the link, then the transaction would start, sending 1000€ to attacker

CSRF - Mitigations

- This happens because HTTP is stateless, and the server is not aware of the site from which the link is accessed
- Prevention is simple:
 - Make the request stateful

CSRF - Mitigations

- To make the request stateful there are a lot of ways
- The best way is to create a random token and save it in the session
- When the link that triggers an action is generated, the token is inserted
- The backend then checks if the provided token is the same as the one in the session, and, if not the backend rejects the action

CSRF - Mitigations

- This works because of the SOP
- The only way an attacker could get a valid token, would be:
 - To get the content of the page (and with SOP the attacker can't)
 - To get the cookie/session (and the attacker can't)


CSRF - Mitigations

- Since 2018, most browsers implement the SameSite attribute for cookies
- The SameSite attribute governs the way a cookie is shared or not to a certain site when visiting or loading assets from another location

CSRF - Mitigations

- The decision on sharing a cookie or not is based on the origin of the cookie, with the concept of "parties"
 - Same Party: The origin is the same
 - First Party site: The origin differs only by the subdomain
 - Third Party site: The origin is completely different

CSRF - Mitigations



CSRF - Mitigations

- To activate this mechanism, cookies use the flag "SameSite"
- This flag can have 3 different values:
 - Strict: Share the cookie only with Same Site locations
 - Lax: Share the cookie only with First Party locations (and same site)
 - None: Share the cookie with every site
- Note that if the SameSite attribute is not set, by default, the browser treats the cookie as lax

CSRF - Mitigations

- For example, let's say the site `www.google.com` has the cookie "foo" with the SameSite attribute set to lax
- If `www.example.com` loads an image from `www.google.com`, the browser will not send the cookie "foo" with the request, because `www.example.com` is a third party site respectively to `www.google.com`
- This mechanism effectively prevents CSRF, because an attacker is not able anymore to send authenticated requests to other origins

Excercise

<http://shops.challs.olicyber.it/>

Excercise

<http://nflagt.challs.cyberchallenge.it/>